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Secret Key and Private Key Constructions for
Simple Multiterminal Source Models
Chunxuan Ye and Prakash Narayan
Abstract—We propose an approach for constructing secret and
private keys based on the long-known Slepian-Wolf code, due to
Wyner, for correlated sources connected by a virtual additive
noise channel. Our work is motivated by results of Csisza´r
and Narayan which highlight innate connections between secrecy
generation by multiple terminals that observe correlated source
signals and Slepian-Wolf near-lossless data compression. Explicit
procedures for such constructions and their substantiation are
provided. The performance of low density parity check channel
codes in devising a new class of secret keys is examined.
Index terms: Secret key construction, private key construction,
secret key capacity, private key capacity, Slepian-Wolf data
compression, binary symmetric channel, maximum likelihood
decoding, LDPC codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secrecy generation by multiple terminals,
based on their observations of separate but correlated signals
followed by public communication among themselves, has
been investigated by several authors ([23], [2], [7], among
others). It has been shown that these terminals can generate
secrecy, namely “common randomness” which is kept secret
from an eavesdropper that is privy to said public commu-
nication and perhaps also to additional “wiretapped” side
information.
Our work is motivated by [8] which studies secrecy genera-
tion for multiterminal “source models” with an arbitrary num-
ber of terminals, each of which observes a distinct component
of a discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS). Specif-
ically, suppose that d ≥ 2 terminals observe, respectively,
n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions
of finite-valued random variables (rvs) X1, . . . , Xd, denoted
by X1, . . . ,Xd, where Xi = (Xi1, . . . , Xin) , i = 1, . . . , d.
Thereupon, unrestricted and noiseless public communication
is allowed among the terminals. All such communication
is observed by all the terminals and by the eavesdropper.
The eavesdropper is assumed to be passive, i.e., unable to
tamper with the public communication of the terminals. In
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this framework, two models considered in [8] dealing with a
secret key (SK) and a private key (PK) are pertinent to our
work.
(i) Secret key: Suppose that all the terminals in {1, . . . , d}
wish to generate a SK, i.e., common randomness which is
concealed from the eavesdropper with access to their public
communication and which is nearly uniformly distributed 1.
The largest (entropy) rate of such a SK, termed the SK capacity
and denoted by CS , is shown in [8] to equal
CS = H(X1, · · · , Xd)−Rmin, (1)
where
Rmin = min
(R1,··· ,Rd)∈R
d∑
i=1
Ri, (2)
with2
R = {(R1, · · · , Rd) :
∑
i∈B
Ri ≥
H({Xj, j ∈ B}|{Xj, j ∈ B
c}), B ⊂ {1, · · · , d}},(3)
where Bc = {1, · · · , d}\B.
(ii) Private key: For a given subset A ⊂ {1, · · · , d}, a PK
for the terminals in A, private from the terminals in Ac, is a
SK generated by the terminals in A with the cooperation of
the terminals in Ac, which is concealed from an eavesdropper
with access to the public interterminal communication and also
from the cooperating terminals in Ac (and, hence, private) 3.
The largest (entropy) rate of such a PK, termed the PK capacity
and denoted by CP (A), is shown in [8] to be
CP (A) = H(X1, · · · , Xd)−H({Xi, i ∈ A
c})−Rmin(A)
= H({Xi, i ∈ A}|{Xi, i ∈ A
c})−Rmin(A), (4)
where
Rmin(A) = min
{Ri, i∈A}∈R(A)
∑
i∈A
Ri, (5)
with
R(A) = {{Ri, i ∈ A} :
∑
i∈B
Ri ≥
H({Xj, j ∈ B}|{Xj, j ∈ B
c}), B ⊂ A}. (6)
The expressions in (1)–(3) and (4)–(6) afford the following
interpretation [8]. The joint entropy H (X1, . . . , Xd) in (1)
1In [8], a general situation is studied in which a subset of the terminals
generate a SK with the cooperation of the remaining terminals.
2Here, ⊂ denotes a proper subset.
3A general model is considered in [8] for privacy from a subset of Ac of
the cooperating terminals.
2corresponds to the maximum rate of shared common random-
ness – sans secrecy constraints – that can ever be achieved
by the terminals in {1, . . . , d} when each terminal becomes
omniscient, i.e., reconstructs all the components of the DMMS
with probability ∼= 1 as the observation length n becomes
large. Further, Rmin in (2), (3) corresponds to the smallest
aggregate rate of interterminal communication that enables
every terminal to achieve omniscience [8]. Thus, from (1), the
SK capacity CS , i.e., largest rate at which all the terminals in
{1, . . . , d} can generate a SK, is obtained by subtracting from
the maximum rate of shared common randomness achievable
by these terminals, viz. H(X1, · · · , Xd), the smallest overall
rate Rmin of the (data-compressed) interterminal communica-
tion that enables all the terminals to become omniscient. A
similar interpretation holds for the PK capacity CP (A) in (4)
as well, with the difference that the terminals in Ac, which
cooperate in secrecy generation and yet must not be privy
to the secrecy they help generate, can be assumed – without
loss of generality – to simply “reveal” their observations [8].
Hence, the entropy terms in (1), (3) are now replaced in (4),
(6) with additional conditioning on {Xi, i ∈ Ac}. It should
be noted that Rmin and Rmin(A) are obtained as solutions
to multiterminal Slepian-Wolf (SW) (near-lossless) data com-
pression problems not involving any secrecy constraints.
The form of characterization of the SK and PK capacities
in (1) and (4) also suggests successive steps for generating
the corresponding keys. For instance, and loosely speaking, in
order to generate a SK, the terminals in {1, . . . , d} first gen-
erate common randomness (without any secrecy restrictions)
using SW-compressed interterminal communication denoted
collectively by, say, F. Thus, the terminals generate rvs
Li = Li(Xi,F), i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, with 1nH(Li) > 0, which
agree with probability ∼= 1 for n suitably large; suppressing
subscripts, let L denote the resulting “common” rv where
1
n
H(L) > 0. The second step entails an extraction from L
of a SK K = g(L) of entropy rate 1
n
H(L|F) by means of a
suitable operation g performed identically at each terminal on
the acquired common randomness L. In particular, when the
common randomness acquired by the terminals corresponds to
omniscience, i.e., L ∼= (X1, . . . ,Xd), and is achieved using
interterminal communication F of the most parsimonious rate
∼= Rmin in (2), then the corresponding SK K = g(L) has the
best rate CS given by (1). It is important to note, however,
that as mentioned in ([8], Section VI) and already known
from [23], [2], neither communication by every terminal nor
omniscience is essential for generating secrecy (SK or PK) at
the best rate; for instance, the rv L above need not correspond
to omniscience for the SK K = g(L) to have the best possible
rate in (1).
A similar approach as above can be used to generate a PK
of the largest rate in (4).
The discussion above suggests that techniques for SW data
compression could be used to devise constructive schemes
for obtaining SKs and PKs that achieve the corresponding
capacities. Further, in SW data compression, the existence of
linear encoders of rates arbitrarily close to the SW bound has
been long known [5]. In the special situation when the i.i.d.
sequences observed at the terminals are related to each other in
probability law through virtual discrete memoryless channels
(DMCs) characterized by independent additive noises, such
linear SW encoders can be obtained in terms of cosets of
linear error correction codes for such virtual channels, a fact
first illustrated in [37] for the case of d = 2 terminals
connected by a virtual binary symmetric channel (BSC), and
later exploited in most known linear constructions of SW
encoders (cf. e.g., [1], [4], [11], [12], [15]-[17], [19], [20],
[24], [29], [33]). When the i.i.d. sequences observed by d = 2
terminals are connected by an arbitrary virtual DMC, the
corresponding SW data compression can be viewed in terms
of coding for a “semisymmetric” channel, i.e., a channel with
independent additive noise that is defined over an enlarged
alphabet [14]; the case of stationary ergodic observations at
the terminals is also considered therein. These developments
in SW data compression can translate into an emergence of
new constructive schemes for secrecy generation.
Motivated by these considerations, we seek to devise new
constructive schemes for secrecy generation in source models
in which SW data compression plays a central role. The main
technical contribution of this work is the following: Consider-
ing four simple models of secrecy generation, we show how
a new class of SKs and PKs can be devised for them at rates
arbitrarily close to the corresponding capacities, relying on the
SW data compression code in [37]. Additionally, we examine
the performance of low density parity check (LDPC) codes
in the SW data compression step of the procedure for secrecy
generation. Preliminary results of this work have been reported
in [38], [39]. In independent work [25] for the case of d = 2
terminals which is akin to but different from ours, extraction
of a SK from previously acquired common randomness by
means of a linear transformation has been demonstrated.
In related work, SK generation for a source model with two
terminals that observe continuous-amplitude signals, has been
studied in [40], [36], [26], [27], [41]. Furthermore, in recent
years, several secrecy generation schemes have been reported,
relying on capacity-achieving channel codes, for “wiretap”
secrecy models that differ from ours. For instance, it was
shown in [35] that such a channel code can attain the secrecy
capacity for any wiretap channel. See also [3], [18].
The paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are con-
tained in Section II. In Section III, we consider four simple
source models for which we provide elementary constructive
schemes for SK or PK generation which rely on suitable SW
data compression codes; the keys thereby generated are shown
to satisfy the requisite secrecy and rate-optimality conditions
in Section IV. Implementations of these constructions using
LDPC codes are illustrated in Section V which also reports
simulation results. Section VI contains closing remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Secret Key and Private Key Capacities
Consider a DMMS with d ≥ 2 components, with corre-
sponding generic rvs X1, · · · , Xd taking values in finite al-
phabets X1, · · · ,Xd, respectively. Let Xi = (Xi,1, · · · , Xi,n)
be n i.i.d. repetitions of rv Xi, i ∈ D = {1, · · · , d}.
Terminals 1, · · · , d, with respective observations X1, · · · ,Xd,
3represent the d users that wish to generate a SK by means
of public communication. These terminals can communicate
with each other through broadcasts over a noiseless public
channel, possibly interactively in many rounds. In general, a
communication from a terminal is allowed to be any function
of its observations, and of all previous communication. Let F
denote collectively all the public communication.
Given ε > 0, the rv KS represents an ε-secret key (ε-SK) for
the terminals in D, achieved with communication F, if there
exist rvs Ki = Ki(Xi,F), i ∈ D, with Ki and KS taking
values in the same finite set KS , such that KS satisfies
• the common randomness condition
Pr{Ki = KS , i ∈ D} ≥ 1− ε;
• the secrecy condition
1
n
I(KS ∧ F) ≤ ε;
and
• the uniformity condition
1
n
H(KS) ≥
1
n
log |KS | − ε.
Let A ⊂ D be an arbitrary subset of the terminals. The rv
KP(A) represents an ε-private key (ε-PK) for the terminals
in A, private from the terminals in Ac = D\A, achieved with
communication F, if there exist rvs Ki = Ki(Xi,F), i ∈
A, with Ki and KP(A) taking values in the same finite set
KP(A), such that KP(A) satisfies
• the common randomness condition
Pr{Ki = KP(A), i ∈ A} ≥ 1− ε;
• the secrecy condition
1
n
I (KP(A) ∧ {Xi, i ∈ A
c},F) ≤ ε;
and
• the uniformity condition
1
n
H(KP(A)) ≥
1
n
log |KP(A)| − ε.
Definition 1 [8]: A nonnegative number R is called an
achievable SK rate if εn-SKs K(n)S are achievable with suitable
communication (with the number of rounds possibly depend-
ing on n), such that εn → 0 and 1nH
(
K
(n)
S
)
→ R. The
largest achievable SK rate is called the SK capacity, denoted
by CS . The PK capacity for the terminals in A, denoted by
CP (A), is similarly defined. An achievable SK rate (resp.
PK rate) will be called strongly achievable if εn above can
be taken to vanish exponentially in n. The corresponding
capacities are termed strong capacities.
Single-letter characterizations have been obtained for CS
in the case of d = 2 terminals in [2], [23] and for d ≥ 2
terminals in [8], given by (1); and for CP (A) in the case
of d = 3 terminals in [2] and for d ≥ 3 terminals in [8],
given by (4). The proofs of the achievability parts exploit
the close connection between secrecy generation and SW
data compression. Loosely speaking, common randomness
sans any secrecy restrictions is first generated through SW-
compressed interterminal communication, whereby all the d
terminals acquire a (common) rv with probability ∼= 1. In the
next step, secrecy is then extracted by means of a suitable
identical operation performed at each terminal on the acquired
common randomness. When the common randomness initially
acquired by the d terminals is maximal, the corresponding SK
has the best rate CS given by (1).
In this work, we consider four simple models for which we
illustrate the constructions of appropriate strong SKs or PKs.
B. Linear Codes for the Binary Symmetric Channel
The SW codes of interest will rely on the following classic
result concerning the existence of “good” linear channel codes
for a BSC. A BSC with crossover probability p, 0 < p < 12 ,
will be denoted by BSC(p). Let h(p) = −p log2 p − (1 −
p) log2(1− p) denote the binary entropy function.
Lemma 1 [9]: For every ε > 0, 0 < p < 12 , and for all n
sufficiently large, there exists a binary linear (n, n−m) code
for a BSC(p), with m < n[h(p) + ε], such that the average
error probability of maximum likelihood decoding is less than
2−nη, for some η > 0.
C. Types and Typical Sequences
The following standard facts regarding “types” and “typical
sequences” and their pertinent properties (cf. e.g., [6]) are
compiled here in brief for ready reference.
Given finite sets X , Y , the type of a sequence x =
(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ X
n
, X a finite set, is the probability mass
function (pmf) Px on X given by
Px(a) =
1
n
|{i : xi = a}|, a ∈ X ,
and the joint type of a pair of sequences (x,y) ∈ Xn×Yn is
the joint pmf Pxy on X × Y given by
Pxy(a, b) =
1
n
|{i : xi = a, yi = b}|, a ∈ X , b ∈ Y.
The numbers of different types of sequences in Xn (resp. Xn×
Yn) do not exceed (n+ 1)|X | (resp. (n+ 1)|X ||Y|).
Given rvs X , Y (taking values in X , Y , respectively), with
joint pmf PXY on X × Y , the set of sequences in Xn which
are X-typical with constant ξ, denoted by T nX,ξ, is defined as
T nX,ξ
△
=
{
x ∈ Xn : 2−n[H(X)+ξ] ≤ PnX(x) ≤ 2
−n[H(X)−ξ]
}
,
where PnX(x)
△
= Pr{X = x}, x ∈ Xn; and the set of pairs of
sequences in Xn × Yn which are XY -typical with constant
ξ, denoted by T nXY,ξ, is defined as
T nXY,ξ
△
= {(x,y) ∈ Xn × Yn : x ∈ T nX,ξ,y ∈ T
n
Y,ξ,
2−n[H(X,Y )+ξ] ≤ PnXY (x,y) ≤ 2
−n[H(X,Y )−ξ]},
where PnXY (x,y)
△
= Pr{X = x,Y = y}, x ∈ Xn, y ∈ Yn.
It readily follows that for every (x,y) ∈ T nXY,ξ,
2−n[H(X|Y )+2ξ] ≤ PnX|Y (x|y) ≤ 2
−n[H(X|Y )−2ξ],
4where Pn
X|Y (x|y)
△
= Pr{X = x|Y = y}, x ∈ Xn, y ∈ Yn.
For every y ∈ Yn, the set of sequences in Xn which are
X |Y -typical with respect to y with constant ξ, denoted by
T nX|Y,ξ(y), is defined as
T nX|Y,ξ(y)
△
=
{
x ∈ Xn : (x,y) ∈ T nXY,ξ
}
,
with T nX|Y,ξ(y) = φ if y 6∈ T
n
Y,ξ. The following is an
independent and explicit statement of the well-known fact that
the probability of a nontypical set decays to 0 exponentially
rapidly in n (cf. e.g., [42, Theorem 6.3]).
Proposition 1: Given a joint pmf PXY on X × Y with
PXY (x, y) > 0, x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , for every ξ > 0,
∑
x∈Tn
X,ξ
PnX(x) ≥ 1−(n+1)
|X |·2
−n ξ
2
2 ln 2
[∑
a∈X log
1
PX (a)
]2
, (7)
and∑
(x,y)∈Tn
XY,ξ
PnXY (x,y)
≥ 1− (n+ 1)|X ||Y| · 2
−n ξ
2
2 ln 2
[∑
(a,b)∈X×Y log
1
PXY (a,b)
]2
, (8)
for all n ≥ 1.
Proof: See Appendix A.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We now present our main results on SK generation for three
specific models, and PK generation for a fourth model. The
proofs of the accompanying Theorems 1 - 4 are provided in
Section IV.
Model 1: Let the terminals 1 and 2 observe, respectively, n
i.i.d. repetitions of the {0, 1}-valued rvs X1 and X2 with joint
pmf
PX1X2(x1, x2) =
1
2
(1− p)δx1x2 +
1
2
p (1 − δx1x2),
0 < p <
1
2
, (9)
with δ being the Kronecker delta function. These terminals
wish to generate a strong SK of maximum rate.
The (strong) SK capacity for this model [2], [8], [23], given
by (1), is
CS = I(X1 ∧X2) = 1− h(p).
We show a simple scheme for the terminals to generate a SK
with rate close to 1 − h(p), which relies on Wyner’s well-
known method for SW data compression [37]. The SW prob-
lem of interest entails terminal 2 reconstructing the observed
sequence x1 at terminal 1 from the SW codeword for x1 and
its own observed sequence x2.
Observe that under the given joint pmf (9), X2 can be
considered as an input to a virtual BSC(p), with corresponding
output X1, i.e., we can write
X1 = X2 ⊕V, (10)
where V = (V1, · · · , Vn) is an i.i.d. sequence of {0, 1}-valued
rvs, independent of X2, and with Pr{Vi = 1} = p, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(i) SW data compression [37]: Let C be a linear (n, n−m) code
as in Lemma 1 with parity check matrix P. Both terminals
know C (and P). Terminal 1 communicates the syndrome
Pxt1 to terminal 2. The maximum likelihood estimate of x1
at terminal 2 is:
xˆ2(1) = x2 ⊕ fP(Px
t
1 ⊕Px
t
2),
where fP(Pxt1⊕Pxt2) is the most likely sequence v ∈ {0, 1}n
(under the pmf of V as above) with syndrome Pvt =
Pxt1⊕Px
t
2, with ⊕ denoting addition modulo 2 and t denoting
transposition. Note that in a standard array corresponding to
the code C above, fP(Pxt1 ⊕Pxt2) is simply the coset leader
of the coset with syndrome Pxt1 ⊕Pxt2. Also, x1 and xˆ2(1)
lie in the same coset.
The probability of decoding error at terminal 2 is given by
Pr{Xˆ2(1) 6= X1} = Pr{X2 ⊕ fP(PX
t
1 ⊕PX
t
2) 6= X1},
and it readily follows from (10) that
Pr{Xˆ2(1) 6= X1} = Pr{fP(PV
t) 6= V}.
By Lemma 1, Pr{fP(PVt) 6= V} < 2−nη for some η > 0
and for all n sufficiently large, so that
Pr{Xˆ2(1) = X1} ≥ 1− 2
−nη.
(ii) SK construction: Consider a (common) standard array for
C known to both terminals. Denote by ai,j the element of the
ith row and the jth column in the standard array, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m,
1 ≤ j ≤ 2n−m.
Terminal 1 sets K1 = j1 if X1 equals ai,j1 in its coset i in
the standard array. Terminal 2 sets K2 = j2 if Xˆ2(1) equals
ai,j2 in the coset i of the same standard array.
The following theorem asserts that K1 constitutes a strong
SK with rate approaching SK capacity.
Theorem 1: Let ε > 0 be given. Then for some η > 0 and
for all n sufficiently large, the pair of rvs (K1,K2) generated
above, with (common) range K1 (say), satisfy
Pr{K1 = K2} ≥ 1− 2
−nη, (11)
I(K1 ∧ F) = 0, (12)
H(K1) = log |K1|, (13)
and
1
n
H(K1) > 1− h(p)− ε. (14)
Remark: The probability of K1 differing from K2 equals
exactly the average error probability of maximum likelihood
decoding when C is used on a BSC(p). Furthermore, the gap
between the rate of the generated SK and SK capacity equals
the gap between the rate of C and channel capacity.
Model 2: Let the terminals 1 and 2 observe, respectively, n
i.i.d. repetitions of the {0, 1}-valued rvs with joint pmf
PX1X2(0, 0) = (1− p)(1 − q),
PX1X2(0, 1) = pq,
PX1X2(1, 0) = p(1− q),
PX1X2(1, 1) = q(1− p), (15)
5with 0 < p < 12 and 0 < q < 1. These terminals wish to
generate a strong SK of maximum rate.
Note that Model 1 is a special case of Model 2 for q = 12 .
We show below a scheme for the terminals to generate a SK
with rate close to the (strong) SK capacity for this model [2],
[8], [23], which is given by (1) as
CS = I(X1 ∧X2) = h(p+ q − 2pq)− h(p).
(i) SW data compression: This step is identical to step (i) for
Model 1. Note that under the given joint pmf (15), X1 and
X2 can be written as in (10). It follows in the same manner
as for Model 1 that for some η > 0 and for all n sufficiently
large,
Pr{Xˆ2(1) = X1} ≥ 1− 2
−nη.
(ii) SK construction: Both terminals know the linear (n, n−m)
code C as in Lemma 1, and a (common) standard array for C.
Let {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m} denote the set of coset leaders for all
the cosets of C.
Denote by Ai the set of sequences from T nX1,ξ in the coset of
C with coset leader ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m. If the number of sequences
of the same type in Ai is more than 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
, where
ε′ > ξ+ε with ε satisfying m < n[h(p)+ε] in Lemma 1, then
collect arbitrarily 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′] such sequences to compose
a subset, which we term a regular subset (as it consists of
sequences of the same type). Continue this procedure until
the number of sequences of every type in Ai is less than
2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
. Let Ni denote the number of distinct regular
subsets of Ai.
Enumerate (in any way) the sequences in each regular
subset. Let bi,j,k, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ni,
1 ≤ k ≤ 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
, denote the kth sequence of the
jth regular subset in the ith coset (with coset leader ei).
Terminal 1 sets K1 = k1 if X1 equals bi,j1,k1 ; else, K1 is
set to be uniformly distributed on
{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
}
,
independent of (X1,X2). Terminal 2 sets K2 = k2 if Xˆ2(1)
equals bi,j2,k2 ; else, K2 is set to be uniformly distributed on{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
}
, independent of (X1,X2,K1).
The following theorem says that K1 constitutes a strong SK
with rate approaching SK capacity.
Theorem 2: Let ε > 0 be given. Then for some η′ =
η′(η, ξ, ε, ε′) > 0 and for all n sufficiently large, the pair of
rvs (K1,K2) generated above, with range K1 (say), satisfy
Pr{K1 = K2} ≥ 1− 2
−nη′ , (16)
I(K1 ∧ F) = 0, (17)
H(K1) = log |K1|, (18)
and
1
n
H(K1) = h(p+ q − 2pq)− h(p)− ε
′. (19)
The next model is an instance of a Markov chain on a tree
(cf. [13], [8]). Consider a tree T with vertex set V (T ) =
{1, · · · , d} and edge set E(T ). For (i, j) ∈ E(T ), let B(i←
j) denote the set of all vertices connected with j by a path
containing the edge (i, j). The rvs X1, · · · , Xd form a Markov
chain on the tree T if for each (i, j) ∈ E(T ), the conditional
pmf of Xj given {Xl, l ∈ B(i← j)} depends only on Xi (i.e.,
is conditionally independent of {Xl, l ∈ B(i ← j)}\{Xi},
conditioned on Xi). Note that when T is a chain, this concept
reduces to that of a standard Markov chain.
Model 3: Let the terminals 1, · · · , d observe, respectively, n
i.i.d. repetitions of {0, 1}-valued rvs X1, · · · , Xd that form a
Markov chain on the tree T , with joint pmf PX1···Xd specified
as: for (i, j) ∈ E(T ),
PXiXj (xi, xj) =
1
2
(1− p(i,j))δxixj +
1
2
p(i,j) (1− δxixj ),
0 < p(i,j) <
1
2
,
for xi, xj ∈ {0, 1}. These d terminals wish to generate a
strong SK of maximum rate.
Note that Model 1 is a special case of Model 3 for d = 2.
Without any loss of generality, let
pmax = p(i∗,j∗) = max
(i,j)∈E(T )
p(i,j).
Then, the (strong) SK capacity for this model [8] is given by
(1) as
CS = I(Xi∗ ∧Xj∗) = 1− h(pmax).
We show how to extract a SK with rate close to 1− h(pmax)
by using an extension of the SW data compression scheme of
Model 1 for reconstructing xi∗ at all the terminals.
(i) SW data compression: Let C be the linear (n, n−m) code as
in Lemma 1 for a BSC(pmax), and with parity check matrix P.
Each terminal i communicates the syndrome Pxti , 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Let xˆi(j) denote the corresponding maximum likelihood
estimate of xj at terminal i, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ d. For a terminal
i 6= i∗, denote by (i0, i1, · · · , ir) the (only) path in the tree
T from i to i∗, where i0 = i and ir = i∗; this terminal i,
with the knowledge of (xi, Pxti1 , · · · ,Pxtir−1 ,Pxti∗ ), forms
its estimate xˆi(i∗) of xi∗ through the following successive
maximum likelihood estimates of xi1 , · · · ,xir−1 :
xˆi(i1) = xi ⊕ fP(Px
t
i ⊕Px
t
i1
),
xˆi(i2) = xˆi(i1)⊕ fP(Px
t
i1
⊕Pxti2 ),
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
xˆi(ir−1) = xˆi(ir−2)⊕ fP(Px
t
ir−2
⊕Pxtir−1 ),
and finally,
xˆi(i∗) = xˆi(ir−1)⊕ fP(Px
t
ir−1
⊕Pxti∗). (20)
Proposition 2: By the successive maximum likelihood esti-
mation above, the estimate Xˆi(i∗) at terminal i 6= i∗, satisfies
Pr{Xˆi(i
∗) = Xi∗} ≥ 1− d · 2
−nη, (21)
for some η > 0 and for all n sufficiently large.
Proof: See Appendix B.
It follows directly from (21) that for some η′ = η′(η,m) >
0 and for all n sufficiently large,
Pr{Xˆi(i
∗) = Xi∗ , 1 ≤ i 6= i
∗ ≤ d} ≥ 1− 2−nη
′
.
6(ii) SK construction: Consider a (common) standard array for
C known to all the terminals. Denote by al,k the element of the
lth row and the kth column in the standard array, 1 ≤ l ≤ 2m,
1 ≤ k ≤ 2n−m. Terminal i∗ sets Ki∗ = ki∗ if Xi∗ equals
al,ki∗ in the standard array. Terminal i, 1 ≤ i 6= i∗ ≤ d, sets
Ki = ki if Xˆi(i∗) equals al,ki in the same standard array.
The following theorem states that Ki∗ constitutes a strong
SK with rate approaching SK capacity.
Theorem 3: Let ε > 0 be given. Then for some
η′ = η′(η, d) > 0 and for all n sufficiently large, the rvs
K1, · · · ,Kd generated above, with range Ki∗ (say), satisfy
Pr{K1 = · · · = Kd} > 1− 2
−nη′ , (22)
I(Ki∗ ∧F) = 0, (23)
H(Ki∗) = log |Ki∗ |, (24)
and
1
n
H(Ki∗) > 1− h(pmax)− ε. (25)
Model 4: Let the terminals 1, 2 and 3 observe, respectively,
n i.i.d. repetitions of the {0, 1}-valued rvs X1, X2, X3, with
joint pmf PX1X2X3 given by:
PX1X2X3(0, 0, 0) = PX1X2X3(0, 1, 1) =
(1− p)(1 − q)
2
,
PX1X2X3(0, 0, 1) = PX1X2X3(0, 1, 0) =
pq
2
,
PX1X2X3(1, 0, 0) = PX1X2X3(1, 1, 1) =
p(1− q)
2
,
PX1X2X3(1, 0, 1) = PX1X2X3(1, 1, 0) =
q(1− p)
2
, (26)
with 0 < p < 12 and 0 < q < 1. Terminals 1 and 2 wish to
generate a strong PK of maximum rate, which is concealed
from the helper terminal 3.
Note that under the joint pmf of X1, X2, X3 above, we can
write
X1 = X2 ⊕X3 ⊕V, (27)
where V = (V1, · · · , Vn) is an i.i.d. sequence of {0, 1}-valued
rvs, independent of (X2,X3), with Pr{Vi = 1} = p, 1 ≤ i ≤
n. Further, (X2, X3) plays the role of (X1, X2) in Model 1
with q in lieu of p in the latter.
We show below a scheme for terminals 1 and 2 to generate
a PK with rate close to (strong) PK capacity for this model
[2], [7], [8], given by (4) as
CP ({1, 2}) = I(X1 ∧X2|X3) = h(p+ q − 2pq)− h(p).
The first step of this scheme entails terminal 3 simply revealing
its observations x3 to both terminals 1 and 2. Then, Wyner’s
SW data compression scheme is used for reconstructing x1
at terminal 2 from the SW codeword for x1 and its own
knowledge of x2 ⊕ x3.
(i) SW data compression: This step is identical to step (i) for
Model 1, as seen with the help of (27). Obviously,
Pr{Xˆ2(1) = X1} ≥ 1− 2
−nη,
for some η > 0 and for all n sufficiently large.
(ii) PK construction: Suppose that terminals 1 and 2 know a
linear (n, n − m) code C as in Lemma 1, and a (common)
standard array for C. Let {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m} denote the set of
coset leaders for all the cosets of C.
For a sequence x3 ∈ {0, 1}n, denote by Ai(x3) the set
of sequences from T n
X1|X3,ξ
(x3) in the coset of C with coset
leader ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m. If the number of sequences of the same
joint type with x3 in Ai(x3) is more than 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′],
where ε′ > 2ξ+ε and ε satisfies m < n[h(p)+ε] (as in Lemma
1), then collect arbitrarily 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′] such sequences
to compose a regular subset. Continue this procedure until the
number of sequences of every joint type with x3 in Ai(x3) is
less than 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′]. Let Ni(x3) denote the number
of distinct regular subsets of Ai(x3).
For a given sequence x3, enumerate (in any way) the
sequences in each regular subset. Let bi,j,k(x3), where 1 ≤
i ≤ 2m, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ni(x3), 1 ≤ k ≤ 2
n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]
, denote
the kth sequence of the jth regular subset in the ith coset.
Terminal 1 sets K1 = k1 if X1 equals
bi,j1,k1(x3); else, K1 is set to be uniformly distributed
on
{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]
}
, independent of
(X1,X2,X3). Terminal 2 sets K2 = k2 if Xˆ2(1)
equals bi,j2,k2(x3); else, K2 is set to be uniformly
distributed on
{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]
}
, independent of
(X1,X2,X3,K1).
The following theorem establishes that K1 constitutes a
strong PK with rate approaching PK capacity.
Theorem 4: Let ε > 0 be given. Then for some η′ =
η′(η, ξ, ε, ε′) > 0 and for all n sufficiently large, the pair of
rvs (K1,K2) generated above, with range K1 (say), satisfy
Pr{K1 6= K2} < 2
−nη′ , (28)
I(K1 ∧X3,F) = 0, (29)
H(K1) = log |K1|, (30)
and
1
n
H(K1) = I(X1 ∧X2|X3)− ε
′. (31)
Remark: The PK construction scheme above applies for any
joint pmf PX1X2X3 satisfying (27), and is not restricted to the
given joint pmf in (26).
IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1–4
Proof of Theorem 1: It follows from the SK construction
scheme for Model 1 that
Pr{K1 6= K2} = Pr{Xˆ2(1) 6= X1} < 2
−nη,
which is (11). Since X1 is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}, we
have for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n−m, that
Pr{X1 = ai,j} = 2
−n.
7Hence,
Pr{K1 = j} =
2m∑
i=1
Pr{X1 = ai,j}
= 2−(n−m), 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n−m,
i.e., K1 is uniformly distributed on K1 = {1, · · · , 2n−m}, and
so
H(K1) = log 2
n−m = n−m = log |K1|,
which is (13). Therefore, (14) holds since m < n[h(p) + ε].
It remains to show that K1 satisfies (12) with F = PXt1.
Let {ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m} be the set of coset leaders for the cosets
of C. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n−m,
Pr{K1 = j|PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i} =
Pr{K1 = j,PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i}
Pr{PXt1 = Pe
t
i}
=
Pr{X1 = ai,j}∑2n−m
j′=1 Pr{X1 = ai,j′}
= 2−(n−m)
= Pr{K1 = j},
i.e., K1 is independent of F, and so I(K1 ∧ F) = 0,
establishing (12).
Proof of Theorem 2: Let F denote the union of all regular
subsets in
⋃2m
i=1Ai. Clearly F ⊆ T nX1,ξ , so that
Pr{X1 ∈ F}
= Pr{X1 ∈ T
n
X1,ξ
,X1 ∈ F}
= Pr{X1 ∈ T
n
X1,ξ
} − Pr{X1 ∈ T
n
X1,ξ
\F}. (32)
By Proposition 1, Pr{X1 ∈ T nX1,ξ} goes to 1 exponentially
rapidly in n. We show below that Pr{X1 ∈ T nX1,ξ\F} decays
to 0 exponentially rapidly in n.
Since the number of different types of sequences in {0, 1}n
does not exceed (n+ 1)2, we have that∣∣{x1 : x1 ∈ T nX1,ξ\F}∣∣ ≤ 2m · (n+ 1)2 · 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′]
< (n+ 1)2 · 2n[H(X1)+ε−ε
′],
where the previous inequality is from m < n[h(p) + ε] =
n[H(X1|X2) + ε].
Since PnX1(x1) ≤ 2
−n[H(X1)−ξ]
, x1 ∈ T
n
X1,ξ
, we get
Pr{X1 ∈ T
n
X1,ξ
\F} < (n+ 1)2 · 2−n(ε
′−ξ−ε).
Choosing ε′ > ξ + ε, Pr{X1 ∈ T nX1,ξ\F} goes to 0
exponentially rapidly. Therefore, it follows from (32) that
Pr{X1 ∈ F} goes to 1 exponentially rapidly in n, with
exponent depending on (ξ, ε, ε′).
By the SK construction scheme for Model 2,
Pr{K1 6= K2}
= Pr{K1 6= K2,X1 ∈ F}+ Pr{K1 6= K2,X1 6∈ F}
≤ Pr{Xˆ2(1) 6= X1,X1 ∈ F}+ Pr{X1 6∈ F}
≤ Pr{Xˆ2(1) 6= X1}+ Pr{X1 6∈ F}.
Since Pr{Xˆ2(1) 6= X1} < 2−nη, by the observation in the
previous paragraph, we have
Pr{K1 6= K2} < 2
−nη′
for some η′ = η′(η, ξ, ε, ε′) > 0 and for all n sufficiently
large, which is (16).
Next, we shall show that K1 satisfies (18). For 1 ≤ k ≤
2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
, it is clear by choice that
Pr{K1 = k|X1 6∈ F} = 2
−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′], (33)
and that
Pr{K1 = k|X1 ∈ F} =
Pr{K1 = k,X1 ∈ F}
Pr{X1 ∈ F}
=
∑2m
i=1
∑Ni
j=1 Pr{X1 = bi,j,k}∑2m
i=1
∑Ni
j=1 2
n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′] Pr{X1 = bi,j,k}
(34)
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′], (35)
where (34) is due to every regular subset consisting of se-
quences of the same type. From (33) and (35),
Pr{K1 = k} = 2
−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′], (36)
i.e., K1 is uniformly distributed on K1 ={
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
}
, with
1
n
H(K1) = I(X1 ∧X2)− ε
′,
which is (19).
It remains to show that K1 satisfies (17) with F = PXt1.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m, 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
, we have
Pr{K1 = k|PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i,X1 6∈ F} = 2
−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
by choice, and
Pr{K1 = k|PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i,X1 ∈ F}
=
Pr{K1 = k,PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i,X1 ∈ F}
Pr{PXt1 = Pe
t
i,X1 ∈ F}
=
∑Ni
j=1 Pr{X1 = bi,j,k}∑Ni
j=1 2
n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′] Pr{X1 = bi,j,k}
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′].
Hence,
Pr{K1 = k|PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i}
= Pr{K1 = k|PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i,X1 ∈ F} ×
Pr{X1 ∈ F|PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i}
+Pr{K1 = k|PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i,X1 6∈ F} ×
Pr{X1 6∈ F|PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i}
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
= Pr{K1 = k},
where the previous equality follows from (36). Thus, K1 is
independent of F, establishing (17).
Proof of Theorem 3: Applying the same arguments used in
Theorem 1, we see that the rvs K1, · · · ,Km satisfy (22), (24)
8and (25). It then remains to show that Ki∗ satisfies (23) with
F = (PXt1, · · · ,PX
t
d).
Under the given joint pmf PX1···Xd , for each i 6= i∗, we
can write
Xi = Xi∗ ⊕Vi,
where Vi = (Vi,1, · · · , Vi,n) is an i.i.d. sequence of {0, 1}-
valued rvs. Further, Vi, 1 ≤ i 6= i∗ ≤ d, and Xi∗ are mutually
independent. Then,
I(Ki∗ ∧ F)
= I(Ki∗ ∧ {PX
t
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d})
≤ I(Ki∗ ∧PX
t
i∗ , {PV
t
i , 1 ≤ i 6= i
∗ ≤ d})
≤ I(Ki∗ ∧PX
t
i∗)
+I(Ki∗ ,PX
t
i∗ ∧ {PV
t
i, 1 ≤ i 6= i
∗ ≤ d}). (37)
Clearly, the first term on the right hand side of (37) is zero.
Since for a fixed P, (Ki∗ ,PXti∗) is a function of Xi∗ ,
I(Ki∗ ,PX
t
i∗ ∧ {PV
t
i , 1 ≤ i 6= i
∗ ≤ d})
≤ I(Xi∗ ∧ {Vi, 1 ≤ i 6= i
∗ ≤ d}) = 0,
i.e., Ki∗ is independent of F, establishing (23).
Proof of Theorem 4: For every x3 ∈ {0, 1}n, let F(x3)
denote the union of all regular subsets in
⋃2m
i=1Ai(x3). Since
F(x3) ⊆ T
n
X1|X3,ξ
(x3),
Pr{X1 ∈ F(X3)} = Pr{X1 ∈ T
n
X1|X3,ξ
(X3)}
−Pr{X1 ∈ T
n
X1|X3,ξ
(X3)\F(X3)}.(38)
It follows from Proposition 1 that Pr{X1 ∈ T nX1|X3,ξ(X3)}
goes to 1 exponentially rapidly in n. We show below that
Pr{X1 ∈ T
n
X1|X3,ξ
(X3)\F(X3)} goes to 0 exponentially
rapidly in n.
Recall that the number of different joint types of pairs in
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n does not exceed (n+ 1)4. Thus,∣∣∣{x1 : x1 ∈ T nX1|X3,ξ(x3)\F(x3)}
∣∣∣
≤ 2m · (n+ 1)4 · 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]
< (n+ 1)4 · 2n[H(X1|X3)+ε−ε
′],
where the previous inequality is from m < n[h(p) + ε] =
n[H(X1|X2, X3) + ε].
Since PnX1|X3(x1|x3) ≤ 2
−n[H(X1|X3)−2ξ]
, (x1,x3) ∈
T nX1X3,ξ, we get
Pr{X1 ∈ T
n
X1|X3,ξ
(X3)\F(X3)} < (n+ 1)
4 · 2−n(ε
′−2ξ−ε).
Choosing ε′ > 2ξ+ ε, Pr{X1 ∈ T nX1|X3,ξ(X3)\F(X3)} goes
to 0 exponentially rapidly. Therefore, it follows from (38) that
Pr{X1 ∈ F(X3)} goes to 1 exponentially rapidly in n, with
an exponent depending on (ξ, ε, ε′).
By the PK construction scheme for Model 4,
Pr{K1 6= K2}
= Pr{K1 6= K2,X1 ∈ F(x3)}+ Pr{K1 6= K2,X1 6∈ F(x3)}
≤ Pr{Xˆ2(1) 6= X1,X1 ∈ F(x3)} + Pr{X1 6∈ F(x3)}
≤ Pr{Xˆ2(1) 6= X1}+ Pr{X1 6∈ F(X3)}.
Since Pr{Xˆ2(1) 6= X1} < 2−nη by the observation in the
previous paragraph, we have
Pr{K1 6= K2} < 2
−nη′ ,
for some η′ = η′(η, ξ, ε, ε′) > 0 and for all n sufficiently
large, which is (28).
Next, we shall show that K1 satisfies (30). For x3 ∈ {0, 1}n
and 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′], it is clear by choice that
Pr{K1 = k|X1 6∈ F(x3),X3 = x3} = 2
−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′],
and that
Pr{K1 = k|X1 ∈ F(x3),X3 = x3}
=
Pr{K1 = k,X1 ∈ F(x3)|X3 = x3}
Pr{X1 ∈ F(x3)|X3 = x3}
=
∑2m
i=1
∑Ni(x3)
j=1 Pr{X1 = bi,j,k(x3)|X3 = x3}∑2m
i=1
∑Ni(x3)
j=1 2
n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′] Pr{X1 = bi,j,k(x3)|X3 = x3}
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′],
where the second equality is due to every regular subset
consisting of sequences of the same joint type with x3.
Therefore,
Pr{K1 = k} =
∑
x3∈{0,1}n
Pr{K1 = k,X3 = x3}
=
∑
x3∈{0,1}n
[Pr{X1 ∈ F(x3),X3 = x3} ×
Pr{K1 = k|X1 ∈ F(x3),X3 = x3}
+Pr{X1 6∈ F(x3),X3 = x3} ×
Pr{K1 = k|X1 6∈ F(x3),X3 = x3}]
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′], (39)
i.e., K1 is uniformly distributed on K1 ={
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]
}
, with
1
n
H(K1) = I(X1 ∧X2|X3)− ε
′,
which is (31).
It remains to show that K1 satisfies (29) with (X3,F) =
(X3,PX
t
1). For x3 ∈ {0, 1}n, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m and 1 ≤ k ≤
2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]
, we have
Pr{K1 = k|PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i,X1 6∈ F(x3),X3 = x3}
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]
by choice, and
Pr{K1 = k|PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i,X1 ∈ F(x3),X3 = x3}
=
Pr{K1 = k,PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i,X1 ∈ F(x3)|X3 = x3}
Pr{PXt1 = Pe
t
i,X1 ∈ F(x3)|X3 = x3}
=
∑Ni(x3)
j=1 Pr{X1 = bi,j,k(x3)|X3 = x3}∑Ni(x3)
j=1 2
n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′] Pr{X1 = bi,j,k(x3)|X3 = x3}
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′].
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Pr{K1 = k|PX
t
1 = Pe
t
i,X3 = x3}
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]
= Pr{K1 = k},
where the previous equality follows from (39). Thus, K1 is
independent of (X3,F), establishing (29).
V. IMPLEMENTATION WITH LDPC CODES
We outline an implementation using LDPC codes (cf. e.g.,
[21], [30], [34], [31]) of the scheme for the construction of
a SK for Model 1 in Section III. As will be indicated below,
similar implementations can be applied to Models 2–4 as well.
A. SK construction
Without any loss of generality, we consider a systematic
(n, n − m) LDPC code C with generator matrix G =
[In−m A], where In−m is an (n − m) × (n − m)-identity
matrix and A is an (n−m)×m-matrix. Then, the parity check
matrix for C is P = [At Im], where Im is an m×m-identity
matrix. The first n−m bits of every codeword in C, namely the
information bits, are pairwise distinct. Further, since the coset
with coset leader ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m, must contain the sequence
bi = [0n−m eiP
t], with 0n−m denoting a sequence of n−m
zeros, the first (n −m)-bit-segments of the sequences in the
coset {bi ⊕ c, c ∈ C} are pairwise distinct.
Terminal 1 transmits the syndrome Pxt1, whereupon ter-
minal 2, knowing (x2,Pxt1), applies the belief-propagation
algorithm described in [19] to estimate xˆ2(1). Since the first
n−m bits of the sequences in each coset are pairwise distinct,
these bits can serve as the index of a sequence in its coset.
Then, terminal 1 (resp. 2) sets K1 (resp. K2) as the first n−m
bits of x1 (resp. xˆ2(1)).
The same implementation of the SW data compression
scheme above holds for Models 2 and 4, too. It can be applied
repeatedly also for the successive estimates (20) in Model 3.
In Model 3, Ki∗ (resp. Ki, i 6= i∗) is set as the first n −m
bits of xi∗ (resp. xˆi(i∗)). It should be noted that the current
complexity of generating regular subsets in Models 2 and 4
poses a hurdle for explicit efficient constructions of a SK and
a PK, respectively, for these models.
B. Simulation Results
We provide simulation results for the tradeoff between the
relative secret key rate (i.e., the difference between the SK
capacity and the rate of the generated SK) and the rate of
generating unequal SKs at different terminals (corresponding
to the bit error rate in SK-matching), when LDPC codes are
used for SK construction in Model 1.
For the purpose of comparison, three different LDPC codes
were used: (i) a (3, 4)-regular LDPC code; (ii) a (3, 6)-regular
LDPC code; and (iii) an irregular LDPC code with degree
distribution pair (cf. [19])
λ(x) = 0.234029x+ 0.212425x2 + 0.146898x5
+0.102840x6 + 0.303808x19,
ρ(x) = 0.71875x7 + 0.28125x8,
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Fig. 1. Simulation results for the (3, 6)-regular and the irregular LDPC
codes.
with a common codeword length of 103 bits, and upto 60
iterations of the belief-propagation algorithm were allowed.
Over 103 blocks were transmitted from terminal 1.
Simulation results are shown in Figures 1 and 2, where
conditional entropy (i.e., H(X1|X2) = h(p)) is plotted against
key bit error rate (KBER). We note that in this simulation SKs
are generated at fixed rates that are equal to the rates of the
LDPC codes used. Since for Model 1, SK capacity equals
1 − h(p), the conditional entropy h(p) serves as an indicator
of the gap between SK capacity and the rate of the generated
SK.
Figure 1 shows the performance of the (3, 6)-regular and
the irregular LDPC codes; Figure 2 shows the performance of
the (3, 4)-regular LDPC code. It is seen in both figures that
KBER increases with h(p). Since SK capacity decreases with
increasing h(p), an increase of h(p) narrows the gap between
SK capacity and the rate of the generated SK, but raises the
likelihood of generating unequal SKs at the two terminals.
It is seen from Figure 1 that the irregular LDPC code
outperforms the (3, 6)-regular LDPC code. For instance, for a
fixed crossover probability p = 0.068, say, and h(p) ≈ 0.3584,
the KBER for the irregular LDPC code is as low as 10−5,
while the KBER for the (3, 6)-regular LDPC code is only
about 4× 10−3.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have considered four simple secrecy generation models
involving multiple terminals, and propose a new approach for
constructing SKs and PKs. This approach is based on Wyner’s
well-known SW data compression code for sources connected
by virtual channels with additive independent noise.
In all the models considered in this paper, the i.i.d. se-
quences observed at the different terminals possesses the fol-
lowing structure: They can be described in terms of sequences
at pairs of terminals where each terminal in a pair is connected
to the other terminal by a virtual communication channel with
additive independent noise.
There are two steps in the SK construction schemes. The
first step constitutes SW data compression for the purpose
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Fig. 2. Simulation results for the (3, 4)-regular LDPC code.
of common randomness generation at the terminals. Although
the existence of linear data compression codes with rate
arbitrarily close to the SW bound has been long known for
arbitrarily correlated sources [5], constructions of such linear
data compression codes are understood in terms of the cosets
of linear error-correction codes for the virtual channel, say
PX1|X2 , only when this virtual channel is characterized by
(independent) additive noise [37]. For instance, when two
terminals are connected by a virtual BSC PX1|X2 , a linear
data compression code, which attains the SW rate H(X1|X2)
for terminal 2 to reconstruct the signal at terminal 1, is then
provided by a linear channel code which achieves the capacity
of the BSC PX1|X2 .
When the i.i.d. sequences observed at terminals 1 and 2 are
arbitrarily correlated, the associated virtual communication
channel PX1|X2 connecting them is no longer symmetric and
corresponds to a virtual channel with input-dependent noise.
In this case, while linear codes are no longer rate-optimal for
the given channel [10], linear code constructions for a suitably
enlarged “semisymmetric” channel that are used for SW data
compression [14] could pave the way for devising schemes for
SK construction.
The second step in the SK construction schemes involves
SK extraction from the previously acquired CR. It has been
shown [25] that for the special case of a two-terminal source
model, this extraction can be accomplished by means of a
linear transformation. However, it is unknown yet whether this
holds also for a general source model with more than two
terminals.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We shall prove (7) here. The proof of (8), which is similar,
is omitted. Fix δ > 0 and consider the set T n[PX ]δ of sequences
in Xn which are PX -typical with constant δ (cf. [6, p. 33]),
i.e.,
T n[PX ]δ = {x ∈ X
n : max
a∈X
|Px(a)− PX(a)| ≤ δ}.
Since T n[P ]δ is the union of the sets of those types P˜ of
sequences in Xn that satisfy
max
a∈X
|P˜ (a)− PX(a)| ≤ δ, (A.1)
we have∑
x∈
(
Tn
[PX ]δ
)c
PnX(x)
=
∑
P˜ :maxa∈X |P˜(a)−PX (a)|>δ
PnX
(
{x : Px = P˜}
)
≤ (n+ 1)|X | · 2
−nminP˜ :mina∈X |P˜ (a)−PX (a)|>δ
D(P˜ ||PX), (A.2)
using the fact that PnX({x : Px = P˜}) ≤ 2−nD(P˜ ||P ) (cf. [6,
Lemma 2.6]).
Next, by Pinsker’s inequality (cf. e.g., [6, p. 58]),
D(P˜ ||P ) ≥
1
2ln2
(
min
a∈X
|P˜ (a)− PX(a)|
)2
≥
δ2
2ln2
, (A.3)
with the previous inequality holding for every P˜ in (A.1). It
follows from (A.2) and (A.3) that∑
x∈Tn
[P ]δ
PnX(x) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)
|X | · 2−n
δ2
2ln2 (A.4)
for all n ≥ 1.
Finally, observe that
T n[PX ]δ ⊆ T
n
X,ξ, if ξ = δ
[∑
a∈X
log
1
PX(a)
]
, (A.5)
which is readily seen from the fact that for each x ∈ Xn,
−
1
n
logPnX(x)−H(PX)
= −
1
n
log
(
2−n[H(Px)+D(Px||PX)]
)
−H(PX)
= H(Px) +D(Px||PX)−H(PX)
= H(Px)−H(Px) +
∑
a∈X
Px(a) log
1
PX(a)
−H(PX)
=
∑
a∈X
[Px(a)− PX(a)] log
1
PX(a)
.
Clearly, (A.4) and (A.5) imply (7).
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on the following lemma
concerning the average error probability of maximum likeli-
hood decoding.
A sequence u ∈ {0, 1}n is called a descendent of a sequence
v ∈ {0, 1}n if ui = 1 implies that vi = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A subset
Ω ⊂ {0, 1}n is called quasiadmissible if the conditions that
u ∈ Ω and u is a descendent of v together imply that v ∈ Ω.
Lemma 2 [22]: If Ω is a quasiadmissible subset of {0, 1}n,
then for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
dµp(Ω)
dp
> 0,
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where
µp(Ω) =
∑
x∈Ω
pwH(x)(1− p)n−wH (x),
with wH(x) denoting the Hamming weight of x.
For a binary linear code, let E denote the set of coset lead-
ers. It is known (cf. [28, Theorem 3.11]) that Ω′ = {0, 1}n\E
is a quasiadmissible subset of {0, 1}n. If a binary linear code
is used on BSC(p), the average error probability of maximum
likelihood decoding is given by (cf. [32, Theorem 5.3.3])
µp(Ω
′) =
∑
x∈Ω′
pwH(x)(1− p)n−wH(x).
Lemma 2 implies that if the same binary linear code is used
on two binary symmetric channels with different crossover
probabilities, say, 0 < p1 < p2 < 12 , then the average error
probability of maximum likelihood decoding for a BSC(p1) is
strictly less than that for a BSC(p2); note that a BSC(p2) is a
degraded version of a BSC(p1), being a cascade of the latter
and a BSC( p2−p11−2p1 ).
Returning to the proof of Proposition 2, it follows from
Lemma 1 that for some η > 0 and for all n sufficiently large,
Pr{Xˆj∗(i
∗) 6= Xi∗} < 2
−nη.
Recall that p(i∗,j∗) = max(i,j)∈E(T ) p(i,j) and (i =
i0, i1, · · · , ir = i
∗) is the path from i to i∗. It follows by
Lemma 2 that
Pr{Xˆi(i1) 6= Xi1} < Pr{Xˆj∗(i
∗) 6= Xi∗} < 2
−nη.
Consequently,
Pr{Xˆi(i2) 6= Xi2} ≤ Pr{Xˆi(i2) 6= Xi2 , Xˆi(i1) 6= Xi1}
+Pr{Xˆi(i2) 6= Xi2 , Xˆi(i1) = Xi1}
< 2 · 2−nη.
Continuing this procedure, we have finally that
Pr{Xˆi(i
∗) 6= Xi∗} < r · 2
−nη < d · 2−nη.
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